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Can rank-order tournament theory or the late selection hypothesis be applied to Japanese large firms? 
　This paper aims to discuss whether rank-order 
tournament theory （e.g. Bull et. al., 1987; Ehrenberg 
and Bognanno, 1990; Lazear and Rosen, 1981） or the 
late selection hypothesis （e.g. Drago and Garvey, 
1998; Levine, 1991; Meyer 1991; Prendergast, 1992） 
can be applied to Japanese large firms. The balance of 
person-related wages and job-related wages in two 
Japanese large firms in the late 1990s will be consid-
ered. The author interviewed personnel managers of 
Rocket Parcel and Sun Steel （real names are dis-
guised） in 1998. The information is from both inter-
views and the companiesʼ confidential documents in 
the year.
　The reason for the selection of the firms is as fol-
lows. In order to consider the typical wage systems of 
Japanese large firms, two very different firms were 
contrasted. These firms are different in terms of 
length of history, type of industry and methods of re-
cruitment. Rocket Parcel is a parcel delivery firm 
which grew rapidly over the last three decades, while 
Sun Steel is a steel company with a long history. In 
Rocket Parcel, recruitment is not limited to new grad-
uates, while managers rely on internal promotion. In 
sharp contrast, Sun Steel is heavily weighted towards 
recruitment of new graduates from high schools and 
universities.
　Moreover, these case studies offer insights into our 
research questions. Can rank-order tournament theo-
ry or the late selection hypothesis be applied to Japa-
nese large firms? The rank-order tournament theory 
argues that the larger the prize （wage dispersion be-
tween a winner and a loser） the greater is the incen-
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ABSTRACT
　This paper aims to discuss whether rank-order tournament theory or the late selection hypothesis can be applied to 
Japanese large firms. The balance of person-related wages and job-related wages were changed in many firms in the 
late 1990s. Is late selection carried out in these firms? What do the personnel managers think of their wage systems in 
the context of these theories? The case studies will be addressed, and they offer insights into these research questions.
要　旨
　本論文は「ランク・オーダー・トーナメント理論」または「遅い昇進仮説」が日本の大企業に適用され得るかを論
じることを目的とする。1990年代後半に属人的賃金と職務的賃金のバランスが多くの企業で変化した。「遅い昇進仮
説」はこれらの企業で実施されているのであろうか。人事管理部門のマネジャー達はこれらの理論をどのように捉え
ているのであろうか。事例研究から、これらの問いを考察する。
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tive. In contrast, the late selection hypothesis posits 
that due to little or no dispersion in wages and promo-
tion among peers, employees keep hoping for future 
promotion, and thus competition and work incentives 
are promoted. Is late selection carried out in these 
firms? What do the personnel managers think of their 
wage systems in the context of these theories?
1.　Rocket Parcel
　Rocket Parcel, which was established in the 1910s, 
is a leading parcel delivery company in Japan, and it 
has expanded rapidly in the last 30 years. Due to the 
nature of its business, there are many temporary 
staff. Standard employees number only 38,000 approx-
imately, but total employees （including temporary 
staff） number 75,453 （54,009 men and 21,444 women）. 
Most （73,071） employees work for the express par-
cels department, and the staff at head office numbers 
is 288. Drivers （34,289） and workers （25,006） are the 
majority, and there are fewer white-collar workers 
（2,537 managers and 12,289 clerical staff）. There are 
20 or 30 women managers. The turnover rate of tem-
porary staff is high （43.3％） but that of standard em-
ployees is only 5.3％ . The recruitment practices of 
Rocket Parcel are different from a typical Japanese 
large firm, and are not limited to new graduates. How-
ever, there is no recruitment of managers from out-
side. They are all promoted from the internal pool of 
human resources. It is common that lorry drivers 
with work experience enter the firm as standard em-
ployees. The standard employees are allowed to 
change their job track subsequently （e.g. from a driv-
er to clerical staff）.  The pay system for temporary 
staff is completely different from that of standard em-
ployees. The temporary staff are paid hourly and they 
do not have access to promotion. The following ac-
count describes the personnel system for standard 
employees.
　Rocket Parcelʼs personnel manager emphasised 
that their pay system is not a typical seniority-pay 
system, but a merit conscious system. That is be-
cause: （1） all employees are initially placed in the 
same job grade regardless of job track or educational 
qualification; （2） there is no custom that a peer-co-
hort is promoted by equal amounts in the early stages 
of their careers; （3） there is no guideline on promotion 
by age. It is understandable that there is no clear con-
cept of peer-cohort in the firm because new gradu-
ates are not in the majority. However, the Personnel 
system handbook, 1997 （Rocket Parcel, 1997） states 
clearly that person-related wages are necessary for a 
stable life. 
“Only when your life is stable, you can provide 
good quality of service to customers. Thus, we as-
sume your life-time employment, and base your 
salaries on: （1） life stability （seniority） and （2） 
job performance （merit）”. （Rocket Parcel （1997） 
Personnel system handbook: 1997, p10）
　Moreover, the handbook shows the image of the 
companyʼs age-wage profile with cartoons of mar-
riage, childbirth, childrenʼs school entrance and their 
graduation, which are closely related to the increase 
in living expenses. That shows minimum living ex-
penses increasing with age until the end of childrenʼs 
education. Subsequent to childrenʼs school graduation, 
living expenses decrease slightly. The age-wage pro-
file is illustrated in Figure 1, but the cartoons are dis-
guised. 
　It should be noted that Rocket Parcel states clearly 
that a concern with living expenses is the basis of pay 
design, and this idea supports upward sloping age-
wage profiles. In Rocket Parcel, person-related wages 
consist of age pay, family allowance, length of service 
pay, regional allowance and employee pay （which is a 
job grade with regular promotion and merit promo-
tion）. The personnel officer argued that their person-
nel system is merit conscious and not like a typical 
Japanese firm with a seniority pay system. However, 
Figure 1 shows that his argument is based on the as-
sumption that minimum living expenses must be 
guaranteed. This is exactly what International Metal-
workersʼ Federation-Japan Council and the Japanese 
Electrical Electronic and Information Unions request 
from management （Harada, 2015）. It is interesting 
that the personnel manager believes that the pay sys-
tem of Rocket Parcel is not of the seniority type. It is 
conceivable that these two apparently contradictory 
points demonstrate how deeply the concept of family 
wage is accepted in Japan. Since a guarantee of mini-
mum living expenses is such a common idea, the per-
sonnel manager does not pay attention to it. Because 
it is a socially accepted idea, Rocket Parcel uses Fig-
ure 1 to persuade their employees that the wage sys-
tem is fair. In these respects, the firm offers interest-
ing evidence that it is a very common understanding 
that wages must meet minimum living expenses 
which increase with age, therefore involving upward 
sloping age-wage profiles.
　This section will analyse the components of month-
ly salary and identify why monthly salary increases 
with age in the company.
　Standard employees receive monthly salaries, 
which are composed of two types of pay whose con-
cepts are “stability: the basis of life” and “job: incen-
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tives”. Thus, they are regarded as person-related 
wages and job-related wages in our terms. In these 
categories, there are a number of pay components and 
overtime pay as shown in Table 1.
　The person-related wages apply to all standard em-
ployees, regardless of status （managers or non-man-
agers） or job track. Person-related wages rise gradu-
ally and never fall. Employee-level pay （shain kyu） 
is determined by a table with 21 grades with 5 ladders 
each （105 ranks in total）. All new standard employees 
are placed in the bottom level regardless of education-
al qualification or job experience. Subsequently, their 
employee-level pay increases according to the result 
of personal assessment. The assessment focuses on 
the personʼs contribution to teamwork, not on job per-
formance, and the assessment is carried out by super-
visors, colleagues and subordinates （“360-degree” as-
sessment）. Because subordinates assess supervisors, 
it is necessary to retain confidentiality in order to in-
crease the credibility of the personal assessment. 
Thus, a networked portable computer （a portable 
POS system） is used, and results of evaluation are 
read only by the Personnel Department. Personal as-
sessment is carried out twice a year and job grades 
are reviewed once a year. All managers must have 
formal training for personal assessment once a year.
　In the evaluation of non-managers, there are three 
rankings, which determine the amount of increase in 
job-level （e.g. mark A: 3 ladders up, mark B: 2 ladders 
up, mark C: 1 ladder up）. It should be noted that even 
if the assessment is marked C, the lowest mark, there 
are always some cash increments until 55 years of 
age.
　Age pay and length of service pay also increase 
gradually until 50 years of age and 55 years of age, re-
spectively. Household allowance is determined by 
family size and the adjustment to the average cost of 
living which varies by region. Thus, when the number 
of dependent family members increases, household al-
lowance rises.
　These components in person-related wages in-
crease with age, and represent the  background con-
cept, “stability: the basis of life”. However, it should be 
noted that employee-level pay （shain kyu） takes into 
account merit, while Rocket Parcel categorises it as 
“stability: the basis of life” （person-related wages）. 
Therefore, in practice it can be classed as one of the 
components of job-related wages.  
　The personal assessment for non-managers is un-
dertaken by a number of line-supervisors and a 
branch director. The main factors of personal assess-
ment are sales, service to customers, general atti-
tudes and safety （e.g. whether there is any accident 
or speeding whilst driving）. While the assessment of 
employee-level pay in person-related wages focuses 
on input to work, the evaluation of pay for job grade 
focuses on output of work. The Personnel Department 
does not specify any proportions of marks （e.g. mark 
A: 10％ of employees, mark B: 20％ , mark: C 70％）. 
Thus, in theory there could be large variances in 
marks. But, in practice there is a tendency that most 
people are evaluated as “ordinary” level （mark B）. It 
means that most people are promoted regularly and 
their pay therefore increases. After non-managers 
are assessed within their branch, there is no further 
adjustment according to the sales ranking of the 
branch within the region.
　There are 5 marks which can be given （A, B+, B, 
B-, C）. The number of ladders which an employee can 
climb is determined by mark, and it varies by status. 
For example, mark A means 4 ladders up for upper 
managers, but 3 ladders up for non-managers. If a 
manager is marked B- or C, there are no increments 
on the job ladder whatever the stage of career.
　Managers are also assessed by a number of people 
who know their work. But, the assessment factors are 
Living expenses 
Age
Figure 1　Incometomeetlivingexpenseswhich
changewithlifestage
Source: Rocket Parcel （1997） Personnel system handbook: 
1997, p10
Table 1　Components of monthly salary
Person-related wages
Employee-level pay （shain kyu） 
Age pay
Length of service pay
Household allowance 
Job-related wages
Pay for a job grade 
Piece rates （non-managers only）
Pay for a job title and licenses
Overtime pay （non-managers only）
Source: Rocket Parcel（1997）Personnel system handbook: 
1997, p3
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different from those of non-managers, and include 
managerial tasks. It should be noted that managersʼ 
assessment has two stages. First, they are marked at 
their branch, and next their marks are adjusted ac-
cording to the sales ranking of the branch within the 
region. Therefore, managersʼ performance is evaluat-
ed according to whether they are “relatively” better 
or worse within a region. This two-tier-evaluation ap-
pears to aim to promote competition between branch-
es and suggests that this is what managersʼ primary 
responsibility should be.
　Piece rates are an incentive pay system solely for 
non-managers. For instance, a lorry driver （the most 
common job in Rocket Parcel） receives piece rates ac-
cording to the number of parcels which are collected 
and delivered, the parcelsʼ weights and the distance of 
delivery, for example.
　In job-related wages, pay for a job grade and pay 
for a job title and various qualifications （e.g. a lorry 
driverʼs license） are common for all standard employ-
ees, but piece rates apply only to non-managers. Like 
ordinary large Japanese firms, Rocket Parcel has a 
job-ability-grading system （shokunou shikaku sei-
do）, in which job grades, job demarcation and titles 
are loosely connected. In Rocket Parcel, there are 30 
job grades which consist of 1-3 ladders （80 ranks in 
total）. The speed of promotion varies by merit. Even 
in the same job grade, some have job titles; others do. 
Because job-title is accompanied by extra accountabil-
ity, there is additional pay for a job title.
　Table 2 shows the model monthly salary of a stan-
dard employee at 30 years old. The monthly salary is 
composed of 84.8％ person-related wages and 15.2％ 
job-related wages. Due to the confidential nature of 
the information, the personnel manager let the author 
know only the broad categories （“stability: the basis of 
life” and “job: incentives”, namely person-related 
wages and job-related wages） 7 types of cash 
amounts belong to. The description in brackets follow-
ing the cash amounts are added as the authorʼs esti-
mates. For instance, it is considered that employee-
level pay and pay for a job grade will be relatively 
higher than the other payments in each category.
　The proportion of person-related wages is signifi-
cantly high （84.8％） at Rocket Parcel. On average, it 
is 39.9％ among large firms with 10,000 employees or 
more, according to Japanese Trade Union Confedera-
tion （1998）. At Rocket Parcel, employee-level pay in 
person-related wages takes into account merit 
through personal assessment, like pay for a job grade 
in job-related wages. In most Japanese large firms, 
job-related wages increase both by merit and seniori-
ty. Thus, if we put employee-level pay into job-relat-
ed wages, person-related wages fall to 44.8％ in the 
monthly salary. It is, however, still higher than the av-
erage figure.
　Since this is the case, why does the personnel man-
ager consider that the pay system of Rocket Parcel is 
merit conscious? As we have seen, he claimed that 
this was so because: （1） all employees are initially 
placed in the same job grade regardless of job track or 
educational qualification; （2） there is no custom that a 
peer group is promoted by an equal amount during 
the early part of their careers; （3） there is no guide-
line on promotion by age. However, in practice most 
people are marked B and climb up the job grade lad-
ders steadily. It may be that the personnel manager is 
comparing the current pay system with past systems 
of Rocket Parcel, rather than with other firmsʼ pay 
systems.
　Considerable amendments to the system were car-
ried out in 1972, 1983 and 1995-96, and the current 
pay system has been implemented since April 1996. In 
1972, a job-abi l i ty grading system （shokunou 
shikaku system） was introduced, and the proportions 
of pay elements which were simply determined by se-
niority （i.e. age pay and length of service pay） de-
creased. The newest amendments in 1996 also aimed 
to decrease the seniority elements, in order to reduce 
total labour costs which were increasing with an age-
Table 2　 Model monthly pay of a standard employee at 30 
years old
Person-related wages: 100,000（employee-level pay）
23,600（age pay）
20,500（length of service pay）
68,000（household allowance）
　　　　Subtotal: 212,100（84.8％）
Job-related wages: 31,000（pay for a job grade）
4,000（piece rates）
3,000（pay for a job title and licenses）
　　　　Subtotal: 38,000（15.2％）
Total: 250,100 yen
Source: 1998 Case study
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ing population. Rocket Parcel was established in the 
1910s, but it is only in the past 20 years that the firm 
was expanded dramatically. Therefore, the average 
age of employees had been young, and the firm could 
afford salaries with high proportions of seniority ele-
ments until 1996. The personnel managerʼs opinion 
must be understood in this context. In the history of 
Rocket Parcel, the proportion of person-related wag-
es has never been lower, and thus he considers Rocket 
Parcel has a merit conscious pay system. When the 
pay system was altered in 1996, this real reason was 
not made explicit. Instead, management explained to 
employees that:
　“The new wage system, which reflects individu-
als’ merit more, was created for fairness”.
　According to the personnel manager, the union of 
Rocket Parcel has been co-operative with the man-
agement. This is typical in Japanese large firms. Nor-
mally, the protection of employment is the first priori-
ty of unions. As described above, the turnover rate of 
standard employees is 5.3％ , and the great majority 
tend to stay in the firm for a long period. In addition, 
Rocket Parcel has dramatically expanded in the past 
30 years, and thus it is considered that the level of sal-
ary has steadily increased. Under these circumstanc-
es, it is very unlikely that an enterprise union would 
be hostile to management.
　The monthly salary at Rocket Parcel is determined 
by merit and seniority, and person-related wages are 
relatively large. In person-related wages, there are 
components which have no relation to job-skills or 
ability （e.g. age pay, pay for length of service and 
household allowance）. As Figure 1 shows, Rocket Par-
cel has a concept that wages should meet individual 
needs at all life stages. These components in person-
related wages increase until 50 or 55 years old when 
normally children become independent. In this corpo-
rate culture or tradition, it is understandable that the 
personnel manager says:
　“The seniority wage system provides employees 
with a sense of reassurance. In my opinion, it is 
important because there is no absolutely objective 
assessment. If so, it is better not to differentiate em-
ployees’ wages significantly”.
　Rocket Parcel offers an interesting example. It is 
not a typical Japanese firm, because recruitment is 
not limited to new graduates. However, the firm has a 
very traditional view regarding pay systems, with the 
philosophy that wages should meet individualsʼ needs. 
As a result, its age-wage profile shows an upward 
slope. In its model of monthly salary, job-related wag-
es make up less than half. In addition, job-related 
wages tend to increase with age. Thus, there is an ex-
plicit mechanism to create upward sloping age-wage 
profiles for all standard employees.
　In addition to a monthly salary, Rocket Parcel offers 
all standard employees fringe benefits, cash payment 
on quitting and a pension plan. Fringe benefits include 
economical accommodation, financial help for housing 
loans at low interest rates, saving plans, and a pur-
chasing plan for Rocket Parcelʼs stocks, for example. 
The personnel manager says that cash payment on 
quitting is the same as a “typical Japanese large firm”, 
and did not let the author know its formula. The 
amount, however, is closely related to monthly salary 
and length of service.
2　Sun Steel: Promotion and pay system
2.1　Background
　Sun Steel （the real name is disguised） is one of the 
largest Japanese steel companies. Standard employ-
ees are composed of 4,620 white-collar workers and 
10,614 blue-collar workers （on 1 May 1998）. The busi-
ness is formed of three sections: steel products: chemi-
cal products: engineering and construction services 
and others. The history of Sun Steel is long and can be 
traced back to the 19th century. In 1998, the author in-
terviewed personnel managers who were in charge of 
blue-collar workers, and obtained information on pro-
motion systems of blue-collar workers and the pay 
system. The same pay system applies to all non-man-
agers （including white-collar workers）.
　Like most Japanese large firms, Sun Steel has an en-
terprise union which, in this case, belongs to the Japan 
Federation of Steel Workersʼ Unions. Managers are 
excluded from the union, and all non-managers belong 
to the union regardless of job track. In practice, most 
university graduate white-collar workers become 
managers at approximately 30 years of age, and thus 
the great majority of union members are blue-collar 
workers.
　The personnel system at Sun Steel represents a 
typical history of post-war Japan. In the early period, 
payment methods and status varied considerably by 
job track, and blue-collar workers were paid daily ac-
cording to piece rates. In 1970, Sun Steel introduced 
single status for both white-collar and blue-collar 
workers. Blue-collar workers obtained standard em-
ployees ʼ status （shain）, and their pay system 
changed to monthly salary. However, wage tables and 
promotion were organised separately by job track. In 
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will be difficult to recruit “smart” blue-collar workers. 
To remedy the problem, some university graduates 
might be blue-collar workers in future. The new pay-
ment system also aims to attract people with satisfac-
tory levels of work abilities. By improving the status 
of blue-collar workers, the new system attempts to 
attract good people from the small population of high 
school leavers.
　The focal points of the new system are （1） to imple-
ment new job grades which apply to all standard em-
ployees: （2） to increase the proportion of appraisal-
based pay to all staff, including blue-collar workers.
　First, the current career ladders （until December 
1998） and pay tables vary by job track （e.g. white-col-
lar workers and blue-collar workers）, and they even 
belong to different personnel departments. Table 3 
shows the relationships of job grades and posts from 
an upper manager （Bucho or Director） to the bottom 
level. Executives are excluded from the table. Job 
grades are shown in the “Qualification” column; posts 
（job titles） are shown in the “Titles” column. Some 
job grades have names which are shown in the 
“Bands” column. The bottom 7 job grades （from Sha-
4 to Syu-1） are non-managers. Under the old person-
nel system until 1998, blue-collar workers were not 
able to be managers. But, in the new system, they can 
be promoted to managers, Kacho-ho in title. In the 
youngest case, blue-collar workers can be advanced 
to kakaricho in title at 36 years old, while most 
white-collar workers reach the title at 30 years old.
　A managerial track is opened solely for those who 
are university graduates and recruited by the head of-
fice of the company. In sharp contrast, the university 
graduates who are recruited by local branches/facto-
ries have the same career ceilings as high school leav-
the same year, the custom of the regular increase 
（teiki shoukyu or teihso） of monthly salary was im-
plemented. But, person-related wages were substan-
tial and made up 60％ of basic pay in a monthly salary. 
In 1973, an American style “job wage” （shokumu 
kyu） was introduced. But, it was arranged in a Japa-
nese way, and the proportion of person-related wages 
was retained at the same level and this part went 
through regular increase. Like most Japanese firms, 
Sun Steel also modified job wage continuously and job 
wages faded away. The personnel managers ex-
plained that in the 1970s job demarcation changed 
quickly and the level of jobs improved greatly. Under 
such circumstances, it was a heavy burden for the 
personnel department to state changing job demarca-
tions and to price them. In addition, due to job wages, 
job-related wages could not increase automatically, 
and the young employees needed to wait a long time 
for a vacancy in posts. Thus, promotion was not 
smooth, and many people complained. In 1987, a job-
grading ability system （shokunou shikaku system） 
was introduced. 
　A new personnel system was implemented from 
January 1999. The aim of this change is to recruit 
smarter blue-collar workers. Because of technological 
development and the implementation of sophisticated 
computer systems in the Production Department, the 
job of blue-collar workers has become elaborate and 
difficult. Thus, the company needs to recruit clever 
people straight from school and train them by OJT 
（on-the-job training）. However, the youngest cohorts 
of the Japanese population will sharply decrease in the 
near future, and therefore university will be easier to 
enter. Hence, it is clear that the gross number of high 
school leavers, who want to work, will decrease, and it 
Table 3　Promotion ladders at Sun Steel before 1998
Qualifications
（Job grades）
Bands Titles
All employees White-collar Blue-collar White-collar Blue-collar
Sanji Bucho Bucho
Bucho-ho
Kacho Kacho
Kacho-ho
Sanji-ho Syunin-buin Kakaricho
Syu-1 Syunin Syukan Syunin
Syu-2 Shokuseki Sagyoucho
Syu-3 Hanseki Tanmu Hancho
Sha-1 Tanto Tanto
Sha-2 Ippan
Sha-3
Sha-4
Source: 1998 Case study
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tomo Kinzoku, always have the same proportion of 
job-related wages and person-related wages.
2.2　Source of recruitment
　Sun Steel refused to disclose precise numbers of 
mid-career recruits. Recently, there has been no mid-
career recruitment of white-collar workers. In this 
company, only when there is an expansion of new 
business and they need experts in the field, there is 
mid-career recruitment. In sharp contrast, mid-ca-
reer blue-collar workers were often recruited. In par-
ticular, most blue-collar workers recruited between 
1965 and 1975 were mid-career. However, the situa-
tion in the labour market changed, and it came to be 
common to recruit straight from schools. This compa-
ny has taken only new people straight from high 
school since 1985, and there is no mid-career recruit-
ment. It is a principle to take almost the same number 
of staff each year, including all types of workers. How-
ever, greater numbers of people were recruited in the 
economic boom of 1992.
　As those who are recruited mid-career are in the 
minority of both white-collar and blue-collar workers, 
their salaries do not compare well. In fact, their 
monthly salaries are lower than those who have been 
working for Sun Steel since graduation from schools 
or universities. Accordingly, bonus and quitting pay-
ments of mid-career people would also be lower than 
those who entered the company as new graduates/
school leavers.
2.3　Promotion system for blue-collar workers
　When new graduates enter the firm straight from 
high schools or universities, there is no wage differen-
tial in the first instance, as is normal in Japanese 
firms. The first placement is determined by job track 
and educational qualification. White-collar university 
graduates start from Sha-2 （see Table 3）. Blue-collar 
high school leavers start from Sha-4. In the first 3 
years, each peer-cohort is promoted equally by job 
track. Because the personnel managers think this 
equal-promotion period is shorter than the average 
for Japanese large firms, they describe the firm as 
merit-oriented in terms of promotion. 
　However, as in normal Japanese large firms, there 
are timetables for promotion by job track in the early 
stage of a career. Therefore, all standard employees 
are automatically promoted to some degree at similar 
speeds, and the members of a peer group are not sig-
nificantly differentiated in terms of job grade. 
　For example, blue-collar high school leavers start 
their career from Sha-4. There is a promotion guide-
line from Sha-4 to Sha-1. A peer-cohort of blue-collar 
ers. The future promotion rule is unclear at this mo-
ment. But, the personnel managers said that it is 
assumed to be similar to the current pattern, which 
does not show considerable differences in promotion 
speed among a peer-cohort in the same track, espe-
cially in the early stage of careers.
　Sun Steel has a typical job-ability-grading system 
（shokunou shikaku seido） in which job grades link 
loosely to posts. For example, a blue-collar worker at 
Syu-3 in qualification is “Hanseki” in band. He may 
hold the post of “Hancho”, or not. If not, his monthly 
salary is not affected because he is paid according to 
his job grade （qualification）, Syu-3. Titles are provid-
ed when posts are available in the department. In 
each section or department, the posts may or may not 
exist. If they do, they may be occupied. Therefore, ti-
tles depend on the situation, and are loosely linked to 
job grades.
　Career ceilings also vary by track, and the blue-col-
lar workers could not be managers in the old system. 
In the new system, in contrast, it is possible. In the 
most successful case, a blue-collar worker can be a 
manager at 36 years old. The differences in the speed 
of promotion and the initial placement in job grades 
will remain, and therefore a white-collar worker can 
be a manager sooner at 30 years old. In January 1999, 
about 500 blue-collar workers are expected to be 
newly promoted to managers （based on the interview 
in 1998）. It is, however, estimated that the increase in 
total labour cost will be small. Because overtime al-
lowances are not paid to managers, the salary in-
crease by promotion is offset by the decrease in over-
time allowances. 
　Secondly, in the new system from January 1999, the 
proportion of appraisal-based pay in a monthly basic 
payment will increase. Appraisals influence not only 
salary, but also task allocation and future promotion. 
Hence, the element of success in working life which 
depends on merit will be much greater.
　This change follows a current trend in Japan. The 
intention is to increase the proportion of appraisal-
based pay and to have greater freedom in terms of la-
bour costs. Seniority-based pay （e.g. the length of ser-
vice and age） does not have substantial flexibility. 
When it is necessary to reduce total labour costs, ap-
praisal-based pay is easier to decrease without the re-
sistance or acceptance of the union. Interestingly, the 
proportion of seniority-based pay and appraisal-based 
pay in a monthly salary follows the agreement of the 
Japan Federation of Steel Workersʼ Unions. The mem-
ber companies are not urged to do so, however it is a 
custom of the industry. In particular, large companies, 
such as Kawasaki Steel, Shinnittetsu, NKK and Sumi-
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lated-pay with 100％ contingent part. The other man-
agers receive monthly salaries, which are composed 
of a fixed part and a contingent part. But, there is no 
person-related wage element, and “monthly” apprais-
als are reflected in the contingent part of job-related 
wages. By contrast, the monthly salary of non-manag-
ers includes person-related wages.
　In the old pay system of non-managers （union 
members） until 1998, the base pay of a monthly salary 
was formed by job-related wages （40％） and person-
related wages （60％）. These proportions are reversed 
in the new payment system from January 1999. These 
proportions follow the agreement of the Japan Federa-
tion of Steel Workersʼ Unions, as described above. 
But, due to the contingent part in personal assess-
ment, this proportion applies roughly in practice.
　Sun Steel explained that the reform of its pay sys-
tem aimed to enhance job abilities and to stimulate 
work motivation. However, it is considered that there 
were also other reasons. For example, this reform 
leads to greater flexibility in total labour costs, and 
helps to decrease the element of fixed labour cost 
which is expected to increase greatly with an ageing 
population. The  new pay system for non-managers 
（blue-collar and white-collar employees） is organised 
as follows:
　There are 3 types of person-related wages. The 
first two are based on age and “personal needs”. The 
third （while theoretically job-related wages） is effec-
tively a scale of regular increments and is seen by Sun 
Steel as a quasi-fixed element of pay.
2.4.1　Person-related wages: Type 1: “Age pay”
　There are two types of age pay in Sun Steel. One is 
called basic pay （kihon kyu） and another is additional 
basic pay （honkyu kakyu）. But, both are age pay, 
and we re-name them as “Age pay” and “Personal 
needs pay” for our convenience. “Age pay” is deter-
mined by the employeesʼ age. If s/he is younger than 
18 years old, it is 54,080 yen. After 18 years old, there 
is an increment of 1,150 yen annually. For instance, an 
employee at 30 years old obtains base pay with the fol-
lowing formula, regardless of job track or job grade.
54,080 yen＋（30 years old－18）＋1,150 yen
＝67,880 yen 
　This formula applies to employees until 40 years of 
age. After 41 years of age, the rate is constant, and 
the same as that of 40 year olds.
2.4.2　 Person-related wages: Type 2: “Personal 
needs pay”
　“Personal needs pay” is paid to all union members 
until mandatory retirement at 60 years of age, as Ta-
ble 4 shows. It is designed to parallel living expenses 
which increase with age. The peak of the annual incre-
high school leavers is equally promoted for the first 3 
years. From the 4th year, some differences appear 
among the members of the peer-cohort. But, most 
（about 90％） are promoted together to Sha-1 over the 
following 4 years. This means that they drop 10％ of 
underachievers. During this period, the differences in 
promotion speed between high-flyers and slow track-
ers are one year or 2 years only. Thus, small differenc-
es among a peer group continue for the first 7 years. 
However, promotion suddenly becomes competitive, 
when they move from Sha-1 to Syu-3. There are sig-
nificant differences in promotion speed to Syu-3 
among a peer group. However, most blue-collar work-
ers reach Syu-2 by retirement, while high flyers are 
advanced to Syu-1.
　The personnel managers emphasised that promo-
tion for blue-collar workers is merit-oriented and 
there is no guaranteed promotion track from Syu-3. 
However, most people are promoted to Syu-2 in the 
end by retirement. Promotion does not stop at Sha-1 
（the end of the first promotion track） even for slow 
trackers, and they are promoted slowly but steadily in 
the long period. Firms do not have an obligation to 
promote blue-collar workers from Syu-3, because 
there is no promotion track. So why, then, are they 
promoted to Syu-2?
　Of particular importance is that Sun Steel considers 
skills and seniority as follows: （1） skills are accumulat-
ed by seniority; （2） there are substantial jobs which 
cannot be evaluated objectively. Thus, it is important 
to have both seniority and merit parts in salaries in or-
der to persuade employees and obtain high work moti-
vation. The salaries are composed of seniority-based 
pay （person-related wages） and appraisal-based pay 
（job-related wages）. The proportion of appraisal-
based pay will increase in the new system
　Consequently, the promotion system for blue-collar 
employees in Sun Steel is that: （1） there is a period of 
equal promotion of a peer group for 3 years; （2） subse-
quently, promotion speed differs among a peer group 
by a year or two years, but relatively small differenc-
es continue for the following 4 years; （3） thus, small 
differences among a peer group last for 7 years from 
entry to the firm; （4） however, thereafter, their pro-
motion continues steadily with a rather wider range. 
But, as we will see below, there is a substantial 
amount of person-related wages, especially for non-
managers （most blue-collar workers）, and the wages 
of Sun Steel are not significantly merit-oriented.
2.4　Pay system
　There are three types of pay in Sun Steel. The an-
nual income of a Director （Bucho） is performance-re-
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of “Personal needs pay”, the total of age pay rises until 
48 years of age. Moreover, “pay for job grade （A）” in-
creases, even if the assessment mark is low.
　Person-related wages （these three types of pay） 
will comprise 40％ of monthly salary, following the 
agreement with Japan Federation of Steel workersʼ 
Unions in 1998. The next category, “Pay for job grade 
（B）” （job-related pay） will comprise roughly 60％ of 
salary, as shown in the next sub-section. 
2.4.4　Pay for job grade （B） （job-related wages） 
　The proportion of job-related wages in the new 
base pay of a monthly salary increased from 40％ to 
60％ from January 1999. Due to personal assessment, 
pay for job grade cannot be exactly 60％ of the base 
pay in a monthly salary. But, it is designed to be ap-
proximately 60％ . The performance of employees is 
evaluated relatively （not absolutely） in each depart-
ment. The results of personal assessment tend to clus-
ter in the middle range of scores.
　In the new pay system, the ranges of “Pay for job 
grade （B）” varies by job track. The variances of ap-
praisals of white-collar workers （university gradu-
ates） and blue-collar workers are from 0％ to 200％ , 
and from 50％ to 150％ , respectively. As shown in Ta-
ble 6, the job-related wages are calculated as follows:
Job-related wage＝（a）＋（b）×x％
Where （a）＝Guaranteed price
（b）＝Base of appraisal
　　　　 x＝0-200％ for white-collar workers
　　　　 50-150％ for blue-collar workers
　Thus, the contingent range is smaller for blue-col-
lar workers than for white-collar workers. The ap-
praisal-based pay is calculated, as shown in Table 6. 
　In Table 6, the ranges of pay for white-collar em-
ployees overlap between job grades, and this is the 
most common type in Japanese large firms （Harada, 
2015）. When employees who are at Syumu-1 and 
Syumu-2 reach 56 years of age, the appraisal-based 
ment is at 48 years old and subsequently it decreases 
gradually.
2.4.3　 Person-related wages: Type 3: “Pay for job 
grade （A）”
　Sun Steel has a typical job-ability-grading system, 
as described earlier. There are two types of pay for a 
job grade （shokunou kyu）, and they vary by personal 
assessment. The first is “pay for job grade （A）”, 
which despite its name is actually a form of a person-
related wages. Another “pay for job grade （B）” is a 
genuine job-related pay and will be explained in the 
next paragraph. In this pay, even if the assessment 
mark is low, there are still some increments. Sun Steel 
treats this pay as a regular increase （teiki shokyu or 
teisho）. The ranges by personal assessment vary 
from 65 ％ to 135 ％ of the base of each job grade, as 
shown in Table 5.
　These three types of person-related wages increase 
annually with age. They are regarded as person-relat-
ed wages in this firm, although there is a limited con-
tingent part in “Pay for job grade （A）”. It is notable 
that “Personal needs pay” takes into account the liv-
ing expenses of the average man. Its peak is at 48 
years of age. It is considered that this is based on the 
consolidation of the necessary family wage to bring up 
children in co-operation with a spouse who is sup-
posed to be a housewife. The age of 48 years is sup-
posed to be the time that the expense of childrenʼs ed-
ucation ends. “Personal needs pay” is not enough to 
guarantee the minimum living expenses, but it is com-
bined with “Age pay”, which continues to increase un-
til 40 years old. Thus, there are substantial wage in-
crements until the age of 40. “Age pay” becomes 
constant from 41 years old. But, due to the increment 
Table 4　Personal needs pay （from January 1999）
Age Pay （yen） Age Pay （yen） Age Pay （yen）
18 1,640 32 21,700 46 44,770
19 2,700 33 24,790 47 45,620
20 3,780 34 27,970 48 46,480
21 5,000 35 31,010 49 43,610
22 6,110 36 32,860 50 40,740
23 7,210 37 34,720 51 37,870
24 8,320 38 36,580 52 35,000
25 9,230 39 38,430 53 32,130
26 10,560 40 40,290 54 29,260
27 11,600 41 41,040 55 26,390
28 12,660 42 41,780 56 23,520
29 13,700 43 42,530 57 20,650
30 14,740 44 43,270 58 17,780
31 18,270 45 44,030 59 14,910
60 12,040
Source: 1998 Case study
Table 5　Pay for job grade （A）
Job grade Ranges of the pay by length of service
Syumu-1 From （3,600 yen×0.65） to （3,600 yen×1.35）
Syumu-2 From （3,050 yen×0.65） to （3,050 yen×1.35）
Shitsumu1 From （2,750 yen×0.65） to （2,750 yen×1.35）
Shitsumu2 From （2,400 yen×0.65） to （2,400 yen×1.35）
Shitsumu3 From （2,000 yen×0.65） to （2,000 yen×1.35）
Shitsumu4 From （1,750 yen×0.65） to （1,750 yen×1.35）
Note: These are 6 new job grades implemented from 1998, and 
are replacement for the 7 old job grades （from Syu-1 to Sha-4） 
shown in Table 3.
Source: 1998 Case study
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3　Conclusion
　The two case studies of Rocket Parcel and Sun Steel 
show how the factors, which create upward sloping 
pay decreases slightly, as shown in Table 6.7. There 
are also appraisals, whose ranges are 0-200％ （white-
collar workers）; 50-150％ （blue-collar workers）. It is 
regarded that these relate normally to blue-collar 
workers, since white-collar workers who are 56 years 
old, are usually managers.
　As described before, the great majority of base pay 
contains person-related wages in a monthly salary de-
spite personal appraisals. Table 8 shows model month-
ly salaries of two blue-collar employees with an aver-
age mark in personal assessment.
　Accompanying the changes to the new pay system, 
the proportion of job-related wages increased in the 
monthly salary. However, its contingent part is still 
only very small.
　The contingent part of the salaries of Mr ABC and 
Mr XYZ are only 5％ and 8％ , respectively. The pro-
portion of the fixed part of pay varies by job grade. 
Yet, it is still true that age is an important factor in de-
termining the monthly salary at Sun Steel, and salary 
increases substantially with age over time.
　Even in the new wage structure of 1999 which is 
specifically designed to increase the proportion of con-
tingent pay, the actual amount of contingent pay re-
mains tiny. The pay mechanisms continue to ensure 
that wage differentials are kept small, and age contin-
ues to dominate the determination of absolute levels of 
compensation. Although Rocket Parcel and Sun Steel 
are quite different companies with apparently differ-
ent attitudes to their payment systems, the new out-
comes are surprisingly similar.
Table 6　Pay for job grade （B） （job-related wages）
Job grade Guaranteed 
Price （a）
Base of 
Appraisal （b）
Variations of appraisal-based pay
（a）＋（b）×x％
White-collar Blue-collar
Syumu-1 199,900 22,800 199,900-245,500 211,300-234,100
Syumu-2 172,800 22,800 172,800-218,400 184,200-207,000
Shitsumu-1 148,800 21,900 148,800-192,600 159,750-181,650
Shitsumu-2 125,200 21,400 125,200-168,000 135,900-157,300
Shitsumu-3 105,800 17,600 105,800-141,000 114,600-132,200
Shitsumu-4  99,900 9,600 99,900-119,100 104,700-114,300
Note: The appraisals of （b） are: 0-200 ％ （white-collar workers）; 50-150 ％ （blue-collar）
Source: 1998 Case study
Table 7　 Decrease in pay for job grade （B） （job-related 
wages）
Guaranteed price （a） Base of appraisal （b）
Worker at Syumu-1 183,200 yen 11,400 yen
Worker at Syumu-2 172,800 11,400 
Source: 1998 Case study
Table 8　 Model cases of monthly salaries for 
blue-collar employees
Mr ABC （a blue-collar employee）
Age: 47 years old
Length of Service: 29 years
Job-Grade: Shitsumu-1
Person-related wages: 50％ 
Age pay …..122,460
Personal needs pay…..45,620 （see Table 4）
Job-related wages: 50％
Pay for job grade （A） and （B） …..166,210
 （including contingent part 17,410 yen; see Table 6）
Total base pay in monthly salary: 334,290 yen 
Mr XYZ （a blue-collar employee）
Age: 54 years old
Length of Service: 34 years
Job-Grade: Syumu-2
Person-related wages: 45％ 
Age pay …..138,330 
Personal needs pay …..29,260 （see Table 4）
Job-related wages: 55％
Pay for job grade （A） and （B） …..203,230
（including contingent part 30,430 yen; see Table 6）
Total base pay in monthly salary: 370,820 yen 
Note: “Pay for job grade （A）” is an annual increment, which 
varies by job grade and personal assessment, and included in 
person-related wages above.
Source: 1998 Case study
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lined the dynamics of dispersion and compression in 
these firms and the role of late selection. It should, 
however, be noted that the firms did not explicitly say 
that work incentives are promoted by late selection. 
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age-wage profiles are combined in the base pay of 
monthly salary. The major factor connecting wages 
and age was a high proportion of person-related wag-
es. Both companies considered that wage dispersion 
among a peer-cohort on the same job track should be 
limited by using brief ranking distributions in Rocket 
Parcel and promotion guidelines in Sun Steel. In par-
ticular, the study of Sun Steel showed that the concept 
of a peer-cohort is used as a management tool in pro-
motion. The personnel managers clearly stated that a 
peer-cohort is at the core of their promotion manage-
ment, and late selection is carried out. The case of Sun 
Steel demonstrates that the late selection hypothesis 
can apply to blue-collar workers as well as white-col-
lar ones.
　In order to rationalise this, the personnel managers 
of both firms explained that: （1） wages should fulfil 
the needs of family life, and have to increase with age: 
（2） there are jobs which cannot be evaluated objec-
tively and large proportions of person-related wages 
are also problematic: （3） skills improve with age to 
some degree. It is noteworthy that Rocket Parcel and 
Sun Steel are very different firms, but the personnel 
managersʼ outlook on personnel systems are surpris-
ingly similar.
　This paper examines whether rank-order tourna-
ment theory （e.g. Bull et. al., 1987; Ehrenberg and 
Bognanno, 1990; Lazear and Rosen, 1981） or the late 
selection hypothesis （e.g. Drago and Garvey, 1998; 
Levine, 1991; Meyer 1991; Prendergast, 1992） can be 
applied to Japanese large firms. The rank-order tour-
nament theory argues that the larger the prize （wage 
dispersion between a winner and a loser） the greater 
is the incentive. On the other hand, the late selection 
hypothesis posits that due to little or no dispersion in 
wages and promotion among peers employees keep 
hoping for future promotion, and thus competition and 
work incentives are promoted. This paper has out-
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